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THE SOUTH KOREAN PATENT LINKAGE SYSTEM: A 
MODEL FOR REFORMING THE UNITED STATES HATCH–
WAXMAN ACT 
ABSTRACT 
The Hatch-Waxman Act created the modern pharmaceutical regulatory 
approval process in the United States. The drafters of Hatch-Waxman sought to 
balance incentives for branded pharmaceutical company investment in 
innovative therapies with incentives for accelerated market entry of generic 
pharmaceuticals. Today, thirty years after enactment, the Hatch-Waxman 
balance has shifted. Branded pharmaceutical companies routinely exploit 
Hatch-Waxman loopholes to block generic competitors from entering the 
market. After much public outcry, United States officials have prioritized closing 
these loopholes. This Comment proposes Hatch-Waxman reforms which follow 
South Korea’s pharmaceutical regulatory approval process. South Korea 
modeled its system on Hatch-Waxman yet made it more difficult for 
pharmaceutical companies to delay generic competitors. The United States need 
not adopt South Korea’s system verbatim. Rather, South Korea’s system should 
be used as a guide for restoring the intended Hatch-Waxman balance, promoting 
competition in the marketplace, and lowering drug prices in the United States. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that over three 
million people in the United States are infected with Hepatitis C,1 a disease that 
kills more people than HIV/AIDS each year.2 Prior to Gilead Sciences (Gilead) 
obtaining U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of Sovaldi® 
(sofosbuvir) in 2013,3 traditional therapies offered low cure rates and side effects 
such as fatigue, nausea, and depression4 that caused over fifty percent of patients 
to discontinue treatment prematurely.5 Sovaldi® (sofosbuvir) has a Hepatitis C 
 
 1 Kathleen N. Ly et al., The Increasing Burden of Mortality from Viral Hepatitis in the United States 
Between 1999 and 2007, 156 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 271, 276 (2012). 
 2 Id. at 273. 
 3 Laurie Toich, Will Hepatitis C Virus Medication Costs Drop in the Years Ahead?, PHARMACY TIMES 
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/resource-centers/hepatitisc/will-hepatitis-c-virus-medicaton-
costs-drop-in-the-years-ahead; see also Richard Knox, $1,000 Pill for Hepatitis C Spurs Debate Over Drug 
Prices, NPR: HEALTH SHOTS (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:22 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/12/ 
30/256885858/-1-000-pill-for-hepatitis-c-spurs-debate-over-drug-prices. 
 4 Ewen Callaway, Hepatitis C Drugs Not Reaching Poor, 508 NATURE 295, 295 (2014).  
 5 Joann LaFleur et al., High Rates of Early Treatment Discontinuation in Hepatitis C-infected US 
Veterans, 7 BMC RES. NOTES 1, 3 (2014), https://bmcresnotes.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1756-
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cure rate of over ninety percent with far fewer side effects.6 In spite of Sovaldi®’s 
therapeutic benefits, Gilead was highly criticized for charging $84,000 for a 
twelve-week regimen (over $1000 per pill),7 making Sovaldi® the most 
expensive drug in the United States at that time.8 In October 2014, Gilead 
obtained FDA approval for a more effective Hepatitis C combination treatment, 
Harvoni® (sofosbuvir/ledipasvir), for which Gilead charged an even greater 
$94,000 for a twelve-week regimen.9  
In response to public outcry, the United States Senate Finance Committee 
investigated Gilead’s pricing strategies for Sovaldi® and Harvoni®.10 In 2015, 
the Committee reported that Gilead’s pricing strategy was designed to maximize 
current and future revenue.11 However, the report further revealed that Gilead 
knew that Sovaldi®’s $84,000 price tag would significantly reduce patient 
access.12 Public and private health care payers issued substantial restrictions on 
reimbursement.13 At least twenty-seven state Medicaid programs limited 
Sovaldi®’s Hepatitis C treatments to seriously ill patients.14 Private health care 
providers also strictly limited Sovaldi®’s use.15 After public and private health 
care payers requested rebates or discounts, Gilead agreed to limited reductions,16 
including Medicaid program supplemental rebates of up to 10%.17 Gilead 
 
0500-7-266?site=bmcresnotes.biomedcentral.com. 
 6 Toich, supra note 3; Knox, supra note 3.  
 7 Toich, supra note 3; Knox, supra note 3.  
 8 Emma Court, This is the Most Expensive Drug in America, MARKETWATCH.COM (Apr. 14, 2016, 5:45 
p.m.), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-the-most-expensive-drug-in-america-2016-04-09. 
 9 Toich, supra note 3.  
 10 Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), High-Cost HCV Drugs in 
Medicaid: Final Report (2017) [hereinafter MACPAC]; see Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Finance, 
Wyden-Grassley Sovaldi Investigation Finds Revenue-Driven Pricing Strategy Behind $84,000 Hepatitis Drug 
(Dec. 01, 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/wyden-grassley-sovaldi-investigation-finds-
revenue-driven-pricing-strategy-behind-84-000-hepatitis-drug. 
 11 U.S. Senate Comm. on Finance, supra note 10.  
 12 Id.  
 13 Id. 
 14 MACPAC, supra note 10, at 5; Michael Ollove, Are States Obligated To Provide Expensive Hepatitis 
C Drugs?, KHN.ORG (Feb. 10, 2016), https://khn.org/news/are-states-obligated-to-provide-expensive-hepatitis-
c-drugs/ (“At least 34 states restricted treatment to patients who had reached an advanced stage of liver disease, 
as determined by the level of scarring on the liver. Thirty-seven states permitted their Medicaid agencies to 
determine whether the potential recipient was abusing alcohol or drugs, and some required some period of 
abstinence. And 29 states would only consider approval if the prescriber was a specialist in gastroenterology, 
hepatology, infectious diseases or liver transplantation.”). 
 15 U.S. Senate Comm. on Finance, supra note 10. 
 16 Id.   
 17 Id.  
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refused requests for further discounts even though few health care payers would 
provide patient access to Sovaldi® based on such minimal discounts.18   
While Sovaldi® offered a cure rate of over 90%, the clock was ticking for 
these patients.19 The Hepatitis C virus destroys the infected person’s liver and 
causes liver cancer.20 In 2013, Hepatitis C had put approximately 17,000 
Americans on a waitlist for a liver transplant.21 If greater access to Sovaldi® had 
been available, many patients would have received early treatment and could 
have been cured prior to the development of liver scarring.22 The number of 
patients seeking early treatment would have expanded the total market for 
Sovaldi®, Harvoni®, and all future Hepatitis C drugs.23 Instead, Gilead sought 
only to gain the highest immediate profit from a limited patient pool.24 
Gilead’s decision highlights the need for more generic drug competition in 
the United States. Prices often fall dramatically when generic drug competitors 
are available.25 Consider the case of Zocor (simvastatin), a top selling drug for 
treatment of high cholesterol.26 After FDA approval of a generic version of 
simvastatin in 2006, the price of a one-month supply dropped from over $150 
for Zocor to $7 for the generic simvastatin by early 2007.27 Falling simvastatin 
prices led to the rise in total prescriptions of simvastatin of more than seventy 
percent within eighteen months.28  
Unfortunately, Gilead and other branded pharmaceutical companies 
routinely exploit loopholes in the Hatch–Waxman Act (Hatch–Waxman),29 the 
basis of the United States’ pharmaceutical regulatory approval process,30 to 
block generic competitors from entering the market. After public outcry over 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Knox, supra note 3.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch–
Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 952 (2011). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §355 and 35 U.S.C. §156, 271 and 282); Yana Perchersky, To Achieve 
Closure of the Hatch–Waxman Act’s Loopholes, Legislative Action is Unnecessary: Generic Manufacturers Are 
Able to Hold Their Own, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 777 (2007). 
 30 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch–Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed 
Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. ETHICS 293, 345–46 (2015). 
THOMPSONRALEYCOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19 5/23/2019  10:37 AM 
462 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
Gilead’s actions, leading United States officials, including President Trump,31 
Congress,32 and the FDA,33 have prioritized closing these loopholes. This 
Comment proposes Hatch–Waxman reforms that follow South Korea’s 
pharmaceutical regulatory approval process.34 While South Korea modeled its 
system on Hatch–Waxman, South Korea made it more difficult for 
pharmaceutical companies to delay generic competitors.35  
This Comment proceeds in the following order. Following this Part I 
Introduction, Part II presents an overview of the United States and South Korean 
pharmaceutical regulatory approval systems. Part III addresses specific 
loopholes within the United States Hatch–Waxman system and proposes how 
adopting South Korean provisions would close those loopholes. Part IV 
summarizes the conclusions and proposals set forth in this Comment. 
I. UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
REGULATORY SYSTEMS 
To put into context the current loopholes in the Hatch–Waxman system and 
the solutions to be found within the South Korean patent linkage system, which 
will be introduced in Part III, Part II begins with an overview of the United States 
and South Korean pharmaceutical approval systems. Section A presents the 
origins and key provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act of 1984, the statute 
 
 31 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Mar. 7, 2017, 8:46 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
realdonaldtrump/status/839110000870109184 (“I am working on a new system where there will be competition 
in the Drug Industry. Pricing for the American people will come way down!”);  Remarks in a Cabinet Meeting 
and an Exchange With Reporters, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201700755 (OCT. 16, 2017) (“The drug prices 
have gone through the roof. . . . The drug companies, frankly, are getting away with murder . . . .”). 
 32 CREATES Act of 2017, S. 974, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 33 Administering the Hatch–Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between Innovation and Access; 
Public Meeting, FDA.GOV: DRUGS, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm563986.htm (last visited Feb. 
11, 2018) (“[This public] meeting [was] held on July 18, 2017 to provide the public an opportunity to submit 
comments concerning administration of the Hatch–Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) to help ensure the intended balance between encouraging innovation in drug 
development and accelerating the availability to the public of lower cost alternatives to innovator drugs is 
maintained.”). 
 34 This Comment limits the scope of discussion to South Korean patent linkage provisions which differ 
significantly from the Hatch–Waxman Act and therefore offer the United States the most guidance. Further, this 
Comment limits the scope of discussion to the abbreviated generic approval process for chemical synthetic 
products traditionally covered under the U.S. Hatch–Waxman Act and excludes the analogous process for 
follow-on biologics covered under the U.S. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCI Act). 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001, 124 Stat. 119, 804 
(2010).   
 35 Ki Young Kim et al., The Korean Pharmaceutical Approval-Patent Linkage System: A Comparison 
with the US Hatch–Waxman Act, LEXOLOGY 1, 15 (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g= 5619213a-4714-4307-8bfd-8e12955841e1. 
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governing the United States pharmaceutical approval process. Section B 
presents the South Korean system that was implemented pursuant to the Korean-
United States Bilateral Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2012. 
Section C compares key provisions of Hatch–Waxman to the South Korean 
system.   
A. The United States Hatch–Waxman Act of 1984  
1. Hatch–Waxman and the United States Pharmaceutical Industry 
The Hatch–Waxman Act has been the cornerstone of the generic drug 
industry in the United States.36 In many ways, Hatch–Waxman has been a 
shining success.37 In 2016, generic drugs accounted for eighty-nine percent of 
all United States prescriptions.38 Further, most other countries have higher 
generic drug price indexes than the United States.39 Hatch–Waxman has 
achieved these results by facilitating approval of new generic drugs and through 
numerous price competition strategies.40  
That said, Hatch–Waxman has strengthened patent rights and granted 
marketing exclusivities to encourage branded drugs to undertake risky, 
expensive, and lengthy drug development.41 Branded pharmaceutical 
manufacturers also command premium prices due to the absence of price 
controls in the United States.42 The United States benefits from faster and more 
widespread use of new drugs compared to other countries.43 In return, over the 
past decade the price per capita for branded drugs in the U.S. has risen to the 
among the highest in the world.44 
 
 36 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 295. 
 37 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 295. 
 38 MURRAY AITKEN & MICHAEL KLEINROCK, QUINTILESIMS INST., MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF 2016 AND OUTLOOK TO 2021 20 (2017); STEVEN M. LIEBERMAN & PAUL 
B. GINSBURG, BROOKINGS INST., WOULD PRICE TRANSPARENCY FOR GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS LOWER 
COSTS FOR PAYERS AND PATIENTS? 3 (2017). 
 39 Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, International Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals 
in 2005, 27 HEALTH AFF. 221, 230-31 (2008), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.27.1.221. 
 40 Id.; Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 345. 
 41 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 305–06. 
 42 David R. Francis, The Effect of Price Controls on Pharmaceutical Research, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RES., https://www.nber.org/digest/may05/w11114.html; see Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 306. 
 43 Panos Kanavos et al., Higher US Branded Pharmaceutical Prices and Spending Compared to Other 
Countries May Stem Partly from Quick Uptake of New Pharmaceuticals, 32 HEALTH AFF. 753, 758 (2013).  
 44 Id. at 758.  
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This Comment argues that the envisioned market balance between branded 
and generic pharmaceutical companies is unrealized because of loopholes in the 
Hatch–Waxman system that branded pharmaceutical companies exploit. This 
Comment proposes ways to amend Hatch–Waxman to close such loopholes and 
restore the original purpose of the Hatch–Waxman Act. To add context, the next 
section reviews the historical origins of the Hatch–Waxman Act and explains 
the reasons for such a balanced incentive system was created. 
2. Origins of Hatch–Waxman  
The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) empowered the FDA to require pharmaceutical companies seeking 
marketing approval to submit evidence of drug safety and efficacy obtained from 
premarket clinical trials.45 In 1963, new FDA regulations required 
pharmaceutical companies to file an Investigational New Drug Application 
(IND) before initiating clinical trials.46 This rule established a formal preclinical, 
Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trial pathway.47 In the final stage, 
pharmaceutical companies were required to submit successful Phase III clinical 
trial data in a New Drug Application (NDA) to prove drug efficacy and safety.48 
Preclinical and clinical trials added considerable time and expense for 
pharmaceutical companies seeking to sell a prescription drug.49 Further, the 
FDA rules applied to both branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.50 
An accelerated generic drug approval process was not available for post-1962 
drugs.51 Since greater competition meant that generic drugs were not able to 
command premium prices, FDA regulations significantly reduced the incentive 
for generic pharmaceutical companies to enter the market.52 
By the late 1970s, few generic drugs were commercially available in the 
United States.53 
 
 45 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 297. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. The U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) has interpreted the statutory language—of “adequate 
and well-controlled investigations”—as preferring two or more separate clinical trials to prove the new drug’s 
efficacy and safety. Id. 
 49 Id. at 298. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at 298–99. 
 52 Id. at 299. 
 53 Id. at 300. 
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Despite being off-patent, approximately 150 branded drugs lacked any 
generic competition.54 At that time, generic drugs comprised only 12.4% of all 
drug prescriptions in the United States.55 Further, manufacturers only launched 
generic versions within one year of patent expiration for 15% of the top branded 
drugs during this period.56 
Finally, in 1984 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) decided 
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (1984), 
which addressed whether use of a patented drug in pre-clinical or clinical testing 
by a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer seeking FDA generic drug approval 
qualified for an experimental use exemption from patent infringement.57 Bolar 
had conducted FDA-required testing prior to expiration of Roche’s patent for 
flurazepam (Dalmene).58 The CAFC held Bolar liable for the mere use of 
Roche’s patented invention and reasoned that the Bolar’s commercial incentives 
counted against a finding of experimental use.59 
After Roche, generic pharmaceutical companies could not begin preclinical 
or clinical trials until after all relevant branded drug patents had expired.60 As a 
result, the Roche decision awarded branded pharmaceutical companies a de facto 
extension of market exclusivity beyond the term of their patents.61 Congress 
quickly responded to Roche by enacting the Hatch–Waxman Act which, in 
Section 271(e)(1), created a “Safe Harbor” or “Bolar exemption” from patent 
infringement for activities done in pursuit of FDA marketing approval.62  
3. Key Elements of the Hatch–Waxman System 
The drafters of the Hatch–Waxman Act sought to balance two competing 
policy goals: (a) incentives for branded pharmaceutical companies to invest in 
innovative therapies and (b) accelerated market entry of generic drugs.63 To 
branded pharmaceutical companies, Hatch–Waxman grants a patent term 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.  
 57 See id. at 299. 
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. at 300. 
 60 CONG. RES. SERV., R44643, THE HATCH–WAXMAN ACT: A PRIMER 1, 4 (2016), https://www. 
everycrsreport.com/files/20160928_R44643_1c2fafad2efe96d4c0fe44f2f23308dcfc059f83.pdf. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 2, 5; see Anthony Tridico et al., Facilitating Generic Drug Manufacturing: Bolar Exemptions 
Worldwide, 3 WIPO MAGAZINE (June 2014), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2014/03/article_0004. 
html. 
 63 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 306, 336. 
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extension (PTE) for FDA approval delays.64 Hatch–Waxman also grants NDA 
holders data exclusivity for safety or efficacy information submitted for 
marketing approval of new drugs (five-year) or new clinical information 
submitted for marketing approval of prior approved products (three-year).65  
The most controversial Hatch–Waxman provision is “patent linkage”66 that 
requires the FDA to delay generic drug marketing approval until (a) after 
expiration of a branded equivalent’s patent term, (b) after a court determines that 
the branded drug’s patent would not be infringed or was invalid, or (c) after the 
patent owner otherwise consents.67 Hatch–Waxman created a patent list known 
as the “Orange Book” where NDA holders register patents covering their FDA 
approved products.68 Hatch–Waxman requires generic drug approval applicants 
to certify whether an FDA approved product’s Orange Book listed patents are 
still in force.69 If so, generic applicants must notify the NDA holder of the 
application for generic drug marketing approval.70 After receiving such 
notification, an NDA holder may sue the generic drug approval applicant for 
patent infringement and obtain an automatic thirty-month marketing exclusion 
period (stay of generic sales).71 
To accelerate generic drug market entry, Hatch–Waxman created the 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process (FDCA § 505(j)).72 
ANDA applications require a generic drug to have identical active ingredient, 
dosage form, dosage strength, administration route, labeling, quality, 
performance characteristics, and intended use to a previously approved drug.73 
ANDA applicants may rely on an original applicant’s clinical data but must 
supply evidence that a generic drug is bioequivalent to the reference drug.74 As 
an added incentive for generic pharmaceutical companies, the FDA offers a 180-
day marketing exclusion period for the “first” ANDA filers to challenge an 
 
 64 Id. at 306. 
 65 Id. at 305. 
 66 Ravikant Bhardwaj et al., The Impact of Patent Linkage on Marketing of Generic Pharmaceuticals, 18 
J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 316, 317–18 (2013); Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303.  
 67 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66; Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303.  
 68 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66; Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303.  
 69 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303. 
 70 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303. 
 71 Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and Generic 
Drug Competition, https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-hatch-waxman-act-encouraging-innovation-and-
generic-drug.html. 
 72 What is the Difference Between 505(J) application, 505(B)(2) NDA & 505(B)(1) NDA?, NCK PHARMA 
SOL. PRIVATE LTD. (June 12, 2015), https://nckpharma.com/505j-application-505b2-nda-505b1-nda/. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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Orange Book listed patent.75 Until the 180-day marketing exclusion period 
expires, the FDA may accept and review but may not approve subsequent 
generic drug approval requests for the same reference drug.76 
Unfortunately, the Hatch–Waxman system has been highly susceptible to 
branded pharmaceutical manufacturer manipulations such as “antitrust 
violations, further delays in the release of generic drugs, and significant 
increases in prescription drug prices.”77 In response, Congress enacted the 
Medicare Prescription Pharmaceutical, Improvement, & Modernization Act of 
2003 (MMA).78 However, the MMA has been criticized for not doing enough to 
close Hatch–Waxman loopholes.79 
B. The South Korean Pharmaceutical Regulatory System 
This Section presents the rationales for looking to the South Korean 
pharmaceutical regulatory system for guidance on Hatch–Waxman 
amendments. It also provides context for Part III, which analyzes loopholes 
within the U.S. Hatch–Waxman system and the proposed solutions to be found 
in the South Korean pharmaceutical regulatory system. The political, economic, 
and historical factors that influenced the adoption of the current South Korean 
system are discussed, with emphasis on South Korea’s decision to give greater 
weight to the concerns of the generic pharmaceutical industry.  
1. The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 
The KORUS FTA was first signed June 30, 2007 and entered into force on 
March 15, 2012.80 Pursuant to Chapter 18 of the KORUS FTA,81 South Korea 
agreed to the following provisions: extended patent terms to compensate for 
Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) patent prosecution delays and 
Korean Ministry of Food and Pharmaceutical Safety (MFDS) regulatory review 
delays;82 data exclusivity requirement for safety or efficacy information 
 
 75 Small Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/ 
developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069964.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). 
 76 Id.  
 77 Melissa Ganz, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003: Are We 
Playing the Lottery with Healthcare Reform?, 3 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 6 (2004).  
 78 Id. at 8. 
 79 Id. at 13. 
 80 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, USTR.GOV, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (last visited May 19, 2018). 
 81 United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Kor.-U.S., June 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M 642, Chapter 18, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text. 
 82 Id. art. 18.8.6. 
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submitted for marketing approval of a new drug (five-year) and for new clinical 
information submitted in support of marketing approval of a prior approved drug 
(three-year);83 and certain patent linkage provisions, including: (a) notifying 
patentees of the identity of an applicant prior to granting marketing approval of 
a generic drug in reliance on a patentee’s originally submitted safety or efficacy 
data,84 and (b) prohibiting marketing approval for a generic drug without consent 
of the original patent owner during the enforceable term of a valid patent.85 
2. South Korea’s Choice to Depart from Hatch–Waxman 
South Korean based their patent linkage system on the United States Hatch–
Waxman system, even including provisions not specifically required in the 
KORUS FTA.86 Similar to the Hatch-Waxman system, the South Korean 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act (PAA)87 permits an applicant seeking generic drug 
marketing approval to rely upon a branded drug manufacturer’s previously 
submitted clinical data.88 However, many provisions of the South Korean patent 
linkage system provide greater protections for the generic pharmaceutical 
industry than those found in the Hatch–Waxman system.89 This choice was 
partly in support South Korea’s historical pharmaceutical industry, which 
consisted primarily of generic pharmaceutical companies.90 The heavy reliance 
of South Korea’s national mandatory healthcare system upon a steady supply of 
generic drugs also influenced the design of the South Korean patent linkage 
system.91  
The Korean PAA further modified other patent linkage provisions of Hatch–
Waxman to promote generic pharmaceutical competition.92 First, the Korean 
patent listing system makes it more difficult to register a patent than its United 
States counterpart.93 The Korean patent listing system is strictly policed by the 
MFDS, while the United States FDA does not intervene in patent listing issues.94 
 
 83 Id. arts. 18.9.1, 18.9.2. 
 84 Id. art. 18.9.5. 
 85 Id. arts. 18.8.5, 18.9.5. 
 86 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 1. 
 87 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, Act No. 300, December 18, 1953, amended by Act No. 14328, Dec. 2, 
2016, art. 50-4(1) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database, https://elaw. 
klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=40196&lang=ENG. 
 88 Id. at arts. 50 to 54. 
 89 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 15. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, supra note 87. 
 93 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 15. 
 94 Id. at 2. 
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Further, the Korean patent listing system has stricter eligibility standards than 
the U.S. patent listing system.95 Unlike in the U,S., generic filers may comment 
on proposed and amended listings in the Green List and petition the MFDS to 
correct or remove inaccurate patent information.96  
Second, South Korea allows a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer to 
institute administrative hearings before the MFDS to obtain patent scope, 
invalidity or noninfringement judgments prior to seeking generic drug marketing 
approval.97 If the generic drug petitioner receives a favorable judgment, no 
certification or notification is necessary and the generic applicant for marketing 
approval avoids costly and lengthy litigation.98 In the U.S., early proceedings for 
patent invalidity have limitations while patent scope or noninfringement 
challenges are only available to ANDA litigation defendants.99 Third, branded 
pharmaceutical companies must petition the MFDS for a stay of generic drug 
sales and the stay lasts nine months.100 However, in the U.S., once ANDA 
litigation has been filed, the FDA grants an automatic thirty-month stay of 
generic drug approval.101 
Finally, the Korean first-to-file generic drug marketing exclusion period 
applies to a broader group of applicants than in the U.S.102 Further, the Korean 
first-to-file generic drug marketing exclusion period is nine months versus 180-
days in the United States.103 The MFDS has more power than the FDA to revoke 
first-to-file generic drug eligibility for marketing exclusivity if the first-to-file 
applicant delays generic drug sales.104 Thus, branded pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have less incentive to enter pay-for-delay litigation settlements in 
South Korea versus the United States.105    
 
 95 Id. at 4. 
 96 Id. at 3. 
 97 Id. at 5. 
 98 Id. at 7. 
 99 Id. at 5. 
 100 Id. at 6.  
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 11.  
 103 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 9; Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, supra note 87, at art. 50–9(2). 
 104 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 1–13. 
 105 Id. at 12–13. 
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II. SOUTH KOREAN PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: MODEL FOR 
HATCH–WAXMAN REFORM  
Part I introduced the major differences between Hatch–Waxman and the 
Korean pharmaceutical regulatory system. In this section, these differences will 
be analyzed in greater depth, leading to the conclusion that South Korean 
provisions provide a useful framework for solving the problems within Hatch–
Waxman. With this conclusion in mind, this Comment will now turn to the 
primary points of difference between Hatch–Waxman and the South Korean 
pharmaceutical regulatory system: patent listing, patent 
certification/notification, branded pharmaceutical manufacturer marketing 
exclusion period (stay of generic drug sales), and first-to-file generic drug 
marketing exclusion period (stay of later filed generic drug sales). 
A. Comparison of Patent Listing Systems 
1. Overview of Hatch–Waxman Patent Listing System 
Hatch–Waxman created a pathway for branded pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to obtain a stay of generic drug FDA approval for up to 30 
months.106 First, Hatch–Waxman established an official FDA database known 
as the “Orange Book” listing all patents relevant to FDA approved drugs.107 
Only patents claiming a listed drug or its method-of-use in which a claim may 
be “reasonably asserted” in a patent infringement lawsuit are eligible for listing 
in the official FDA Orange Book.108 Patents claiming pharmaceutical substance, 
formulation, composition, and medical uses are eligible for the Orange Book109 
while pharmaceutical manufacturing processes, packaging, metabolites, and 
intermediates are not.110  
2. Loopholes in the Hatch–Waxman Patent Listing System 
a. Eligibility of Secondary Patents for Orange Book Listing 
Patent evergreening is the filing of later issuing patents, often of 
questionable validity, covering a branded drug and eligible for listing in the 
 
 106 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66; Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303. 
 107 Bhardwaj, et al., supra note 66; Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303. 
 108 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2014)). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See id. at 303–04. 
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Orange Book for the purpose of delaying generic competition.111 Rather than 
covering the active ingredient, these secondary patents cover ancillary aspects 
such as different coatings, salt forms, crystalline structures, or metabolites of the 
approved pharmaceutical active.112 Even if secondary patents do not improve 
the approved pharmaceutical active’s safety or efficacy, branded pharmaceutical 
companies work with doctors directly to convince them to prescribe second-
generation pharmaceuticals prior to the expiration of the original patents.113 
Branded pharmaceutical companies also market second-generation drugs 
directly to consumers through media campaigns and coupons.114 Physician and 
patient preferences for second-generation products reduce the incentive to 
launch a generic version of the original drug.115 
b. Eligibility of REMS Patents for Orange Book Listing 
Under the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), the FDA is authorized 
to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to utilize Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategies (REMS) to analyze the risks versus the benefits of a 
pharmaceutical product.116 REMS are safety strategies that go beyond FDA-
approved labeling.117 In utilizing REMS, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may 
need to provide information to patients (a medication guide), information for 
healthcare providers (a communication plan) or may be required to provide 
“Elements to Assure Safe Use” (e.g., healthcare  provider  training, patient 
monitoring, or physician/pharmacy registries).118 Proprietary REMS are both 
patentable and eligible for Orange Book listing.119 Although the FDAAA 
explicitly prohibits using REMS to block or delay ANDA approval, such REMS 
patents can be used to trigger thirty-month stays of FDA approval.120   
 
 111 See id. at 304; see generally C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, 
and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 327–28 (2012) (describing the practice 
of patent evergreening by branded pharmaceutical companies). 
 112 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 304.  
 113 LIEBERMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 38, at 5, 9. 
 114 Id. at 9. 
 115 See id. 
 116 Food and Pharmaceutical Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 
(2007); Erika Lietzan et al., The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 2 BIO-SCI. L.R. 39, 
48 (2006/2007). 
 117 Lietzan et al., supra note 120. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See, e.g., Thalidomide, FDA ORANGE BOOK, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/index. 
cfm (use “Search by Patent Number” search field; then search “7,141,018”). 
 120 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66. 
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c. FDA’s Ministerial Role Incentivizes Improper Orange Book Listings 
The Hatch–Waxman statute lacks an explicit grant of FDA authority to 
correct or delete any information contained in the Orange Book.121 
Consequently, the FDA has adopted a “purely ministerial” role in operating the 
Orange Book.122 The FDA reviews patent listing applications for compliance 
with formal requirements123 but declines to determine whether patents in fact 
properly describe the approved pharmaceutical compounds or their uses.124 
Further, the FDA refuses to correct or delete Orange Book listings that fail to 
meet statutory requirements.125 Courts have deferred to the FDA’s choice of a 
neutral administrative position.126  
Third parties, such as generic manufacturers, do not have a cause of action 
to force the FDA to correct or delete an improper Orange Book listing and are 
therefore unable to avoid automatic thirty-month stays of generic approval even 
when listings in the Orange Book are invalid.127 The Supreme Court confirmed 
Congress’s intent in the MMA to grant ANDA applicants sued for patent 
infringement the right to assert a counterclaim against the NDA owner based on 
an improperly listed patent, but only after an NDA owner has sued an ANDA 
applicant for patent infringement.128 Then the ANDA applicant has the burden 
to prove that a listed patent does not claim the precise pharmaceutical or method 
which an ANDA applicant seeks to market.129 Thus, by refusing to police the 
Orange Book, the FDA has added unnecessary delays and costs for generic 
manufacturers. 
The FDA took a small step toward an agency Orange Book dispute 
resolution process in its 2016 Final Rule.130 When ANDA applicants dispute 
 
 121 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2016). 
 122 Prioritizing Public Health: The FDA’s Role in the Generic Drug Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Agric., Rural Dev., Food and Drug Admin., and Related Agencies, Comm. On Appropriations, 
114th Cong. 10 (2016) (statement of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 407 n.2 (2012). 
 127 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66; see Caraco, 566 U.S. at 404–07, 424–26 (holding that generic 
manufacturers could assert a counterclaim against a brand manufacturer, but not against the FDA, to challenge 
an overbroad Orange Book listing) 
 128 See Caraco, 566 U.S. at 413–15.  
 129 See id. Even if the ANDA applicant meets its burden, the onus is on the branded manufacturer to 
petition the FDA to correct the Orange Book listing. 
 130 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f)(1)(i) (2016).  
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Orange Book listings, the FDA requires NDA holders to support the accuracy 
and correctness of the Orange Book listing in a detailed response to the FDA.131 
While the FDA requires an NDA holder to correct, amend, and defend Orange 
Book patent listings, the FDA still refuses to review the accuracy of Orange 
Book listings or to settle disputes by reviewing an NDA holder’s detailed 
response.132  
The FDA has threatened to establish “a process to review a proposed 
labeling carve-out with deference to the 505(b)(2) and/or ANDA applicant(s)’ 
interpretation of the scope of the patent” if the current “incremental approach” 
is ineffective.133 However, branded pharmaceutical companies are likely to 
disregard this threat since the FDA chose to omit this requirement from the 2016 
Final Rule even though it was part of the original proposed rule.134 
d. NDA Amendments Block FDA Approval of Skinny Label ANDAs 
Often a listed pharmaceutical has multiple FDA-approved uses, and the 
NDA holder’s Orange Book listed patents or FDA exclusivities may only cover 
a portion of these approved uses.135 As an added incentive for generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to seek FDA marketing approval, Hatch–
Waxman authorized approval of a generic drug under a Section VIII Statement 
if the generic drug applicant only seeks marketing approval for a method-of-use 
not covered by Orange Book listed patents or FDA exclusivities.136  
Section VIII (Skinny Label) marketing approval  authorizes generic drug 
applicants to propose modified labels to exclude “carve out” approved uses still 
covered by Orange Book listed method-of-use patents or FDA exclusivities.137 
NDA holders are required to list method-of-use patents on a claim-by-claim 
basis to inform Skinny Label applicants whether listed patent claims cover the 
sought method-of-use.138 An applicant may market a generic version of a listed 
 
 131 Id. at § 314.53(f)(1)(i)(A).  
 132 Id. The burden remains upon the NDA holder to withdraw or amend patent information in the Orange 
Book. 
 133 Abbreviated New Pharmaceutical Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications: Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 
69,580, 69,581 (Oct. 6, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.53) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
 134 Abbreviated New Pharmaceutical Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications: Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 6,802, 6826 (Feb. 6, 2015) (proposing in § 314.53(f)(i) that “the Agency will review the proposed labeling 
for the 505(b)(2) application or ANDA with deference to the 505(b)(2) or ANDA applicant’s interpretation of 
the scope of the patent.”). 
 135 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2017); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(iii)(A) (2016). 
 136 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(iii)(A).  
 137 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(iii)(A).  
 138 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (“The applicant must separately identify each pending or approved 
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drug for those methods-of-use that are not covered by the Orange Book or by 
FDA exclusivities once the FDA determines that a proposed generic drug 
product is at least as safe and effective as the Orange Book listed drug for all 
available uses.139  
When a branded pharmaceutical manufacturer is allowed to amend an NDA 
method-of-use prior to ANDA marketing approval, the FDA often must deny a 
Skinny Label application.140 The FDA addressed this issue in its 2016 Final Rule 
by changing the definition of timely filed patent information to within thirty days 
of patent issuance, corresponding product label change, or change of claim 
construction ordered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) or 
Federal court.141 Limits on timely amendments assist Skinny Label applicants to 
gain market approval for some methods-of-use which differ from first-listed 
Orange Book methods-of-use.142 However, by refusing to review the accuracy 
of Orange Book listings, the FDA has created an incentive for NDA holders to 
list improper methods-of-use to block Skinny Label applicants.143 Further, 
generic drug applicants may not launch a Skinny Label of an original formula if 
a branded pharmaceutical manufacturer has convinced doctors to switch to a 
new formula and methods-of-use covered by secondary patents.144 
3. Lessons from the South Korean Patent Listing System 
a. South Korean Green List has Narrower Scope than Orange Book 
The Korean PAA created the “Green List,”145 the South Korean counterpart 
to the Orange Book in the United States. An applicant for product marketing 
approval for a new pharmaceutical may apply to the MFDS to have a patent 
listed on the Green List.146 The Green List may be sought for patents that (a) are 
 
method of use and related patent claim(s).”). 
 139 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7) (2017). 
 140 See Caraco, 566 U.S. at 406–07. 
 141 Final Rule, supra note 137. 
 142 FDA Issues Final Rule on Abbreviated New Pharmaceutical and 505(b)(2) Applications, Latham & 
Watkins Client Alert News Flash, Oct. 6, 2016 at 1–2, https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/FDA-final-rule-
abbreviated-new-pharmaceutical-505b2-applications. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See LIEBERMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 38, at 9. 
 145 Keum Nang Park et al., South Korea’s Patent-Approval Linkage System, IAM MAG., July/August 2014, 
at 121, http://www.iam-media.com/Magazine/Issue/66/Management-report/South-Koreas-Patent-Approval-
Linkage-System.  
 146 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND PHARMACEUTICAL SAFETY EVALUATION, MINISTRY OF FOOD 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL SAFETY, KOREA, PUB. REG. NO. 11-1471057-000238-01, GUIDE TO PHARMACEUTICAL 
APPROVAL SYSTEM IN KOREA 34 (2017) [hereinafter NIFPSE]. 
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not expired based on patent term, patent invalidity, relinquishment, etc.; (b) 
claim a pharmaceutical substance, dosage, composition, or medical use; (c) 
directly relate to a pharmaceutical product with marketing approval or amended 
marketing approval; and (d) has a patent filing date prior to the marketing 
approval date or amended marketing approval date.147  
The scope of the Green List is narrower than that of the Orange Book. First, 
while the South Korean MFDS mandates the creation of REMS for 
pharmaceutical regulatory approval, REMS patents are not eligible for the Green 
List.148 Second, the Green List is limited to patents filed prior to the marketing 
approval date, which restricts the Green List to patents used in pharmaceutical 
development.149 Third, an NDA holder must list patents on a claim-by-claim 
basis in the Green List while an NDA holder is not required to do so in the 
Orange Book.150 
Several current problems in the Hatch–Waxman system may be solved by 
narrowing the Orange Book scope to more closely resemble that of the Green 
List. Branded pharmaceutical companies would no longer be able to improperly 
list patents in the Orange Book, use secondary and REMS patents to extend their 
patent monopoly, and to amend methods-of-use to block generic Skinny Label 
ANDA applications.151  
b. MFDS Polices Green List, FDA Refuses to Manage Orange Book 
The Korean MFDS, equivalent to the FDA, oversees all drug marketing 
approvals in its role to ensure pharmaceutical safety.152 The MFDS takes a more 
active role in managing the Green list compared to the FDA’s “ministerial” 
approach to the Orange Book.153 The MFDS actively enforces the Green List 
requirements, performing a substantive review of patent listing applications.154 
 
 147 Id. at 35. 
 148 See Sang Bong Kim, Korea Healthcare Strategy for the Improvement of Access, Ministry of Food 
and Drug Safety (Apr. 2016), https://apac-asia.com/images/achievements/pdf/5th/ATIM_03_Kim.pdf. 
 149 See Kim et al., supra note 35, at 2. 
 150 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, supra note 87, arts. 31-3(1), 50-2(6); Enforcement Decree of the 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, Presidential Decree No. 20130, June 28, 2007, amended by Presidential Decree No. 
27673, Dec. 13, 2016, Article 18(2) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database, 
https://elaw.klri. re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=40268&lang=ENG. 
 151 See Robin Feldman; Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical 
Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 535–36 (2016). 
 152 See NIFPSE, supra note 151, at 1.  
 153 See Kim et al., supra note 35, at 2. 
 154 Id. 
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Such applications must provide considerably more detailed information to 
demonstrate to the MFDS that all statutory requirements have been met.155  
A contested requirement is how “directly related” to a pharmaceutical 
product submitted for marketing approval must a patent be for Green Book 
listing eligibility.156 The MFDS often demands supplemental information to 
determine this issue.157 The MFDS strictly interprets the phrase “directly 
related” as to require an exact match between a patent claim and the approved 
pharmaceutical product.158 The MFDS will edit listed patent claims to narrow 
the claim scope to directly match the approved product.159 
Further, the MFDS will exercise its discretion to delete or amend the Green 
List if the pharmaceutical no longer meets the listing requirements or the patent 
was registered “deceitfully or otherwise fraudulently.”160 During the process of 
deleting or amending the Green List, the MFDS must “seek the opinions of 
interested persons” in advance, including generic applicants for marketing 
approval.161  
Several current problems in the Hatch–Waxman system may be solved by 
directing the FDA to police Orange Book listings in the same manner that the 
MFDS manages the Green List.  The FDA would have to deny Orange Book 
listing to initial applications that fail to meet statutory requirements. If the patent 
status changed for an NDA holder, the FDA would have to correct or remove 
the Orange Book listing. Further, the opinions of generic pharmaceutical 
companies would be taken into consideration during such a process. As a result, 
the number of improper Orange Book entries and their resultant automatic thirty-
month stays of generic approval would be expected to decrease. Generic 
pharmaceutical companies would thus avoid the danger of infringing overly 
broad, non-related patent claims.  
 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Young Kim, Patent Linkage System in Korea, AIPPI.ORG (Sept. 16, 2014), https://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/YKim_Speaker_Pres_Pharma_4_010914.pdf. 
 159 See id. at 10. 
 160 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, supra note 87, art. 50-3(4). 
 161 Id. arts. 50-3(3), 50-3(4). 
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B. Comparison of Patent Certification/Notification Systems 
1. Overview of Hatch–Waxman Patent Certification/Notification System 
In the Hatch–Waxman system’s second step toward thirty-month stays of 
generic FDA approval; each generic applicant must certify the status of Orange 
Book listed patents of the branded product under one of four certifications:162  
[T]hat no patents existed (Paragraph 1); that previous relevant patents 
were expired (Paragraph II); that they would wait until currently in-
force patents expired to market their visions (Paragraph III); or that 
their versions did not infringe these patents or that the patents were 
invalid [known as Paragraph IV].163  
In the Hatch–Waxman system’s third step toward thirty-month stays of 
generic FDA approval, each generic Paragraph IV applicant must notify the 
brand-name manufacturer.164 A Paragraph IV certification is a statutory act of 
infringement,165 and the branded pharmaceutical manufacturer has forty-five 
days from notice to file a patent infringement lawsuit.166 Once a branded 
pharmaceutical manufacturer files an ANDA lawsuit, the FDA institutes a thirty-
month stay of marketing approval on top of any other FDA exclusivity.167 
2. Loopholes in Hatch–Waxman Certification/Notification System 
a. Hatch–Waxman Incentivizes NDA Holders to Institute Litigation  
Once a branded pharmaceutical manufacturer timely files a patent 
infringement lawsuit against an ANDA Paragraph IV filer, the FDA is 
automatically prevented from approving that ANDA Paragraph IV application 
until the ANDA filer receives a favorable judgment of patent invalidity or 
noninfringement or the thirty-month stay has expired.168 Branded 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have a great incentive to delay generic 
competition, thus most NDA holders file such ANDA lawsuits to obtain an 
 
 162 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id.; Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66. 
 167 See Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 303. 
 168 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66, at 317. 
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automatic thirty-month stay of FDA marketing approval.169 Such litigation is 
now the norm in the pharmaceutical industry.170  
The automatic nature of the thirty-month stay greatly incentivizes branded 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to file patent infringement suits against ANDA 
Paragraph IV applicants, even in cases where patents are likely to be judged 
invalid or noninfringed.171 The thirty-month stay also provides considerable 
incentive to engage in patent evergreening—filling the Orange Book with as 
many secondary and REMS patents as possible, no matter how small the change 
to the regulated product.172 This would guarantee that ANDA applicants make 
Paragraph IV certifications to the secondary patents even after the original patent 
covering the branded drug has expired. 
b. Hatch–Waxman Incentivizes Untimely Orange Book Listings  
Prior to the MMA, an ANDA filer seeking generic approval of a branded 
pharmaceutical also could face multiple thirty-month stays if new patents 
covering the pharmaceutical were added to the Orange Book after their ANDA 
filing date.173 ANDA filers had to submit new Paragraph IV certifications for 
each new patent, allowing NDA holders to file new patent infringement actions 
and trigger new thirty-month stays of FDA approval.174 After the MMA, the 
FDA broadened the scope of untimely-filed patents to include those submitted 
on or after an ANDA filing date.175 While ANDA filers no longer are required 
to certify untimely-filed patents and no longer are subject to multiple thirty-
month stays, untimely-filed patents still may be listed in the Orange Book and 
contribute to patent evergreening for later filed ANDA applications.176 
c. Hatch–Waxman Early Patent Challenges are Limited and Ineffective 
At the USPTO, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) can institute 
proceedings to review patentability such as a Post Grant Review (PGR) which 
 
 169 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66. 
 170 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 25, at 952. 
 171 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 320. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Meredith H. Boerschlein & Shana K. Cyr, Intricacies of the 30-Month Stay in Pharmaceutical Patent 
Cases, AM. PHARMACEUTICAL REV. (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.americanpharmaceuticalreview.com/ 
Featured-Articles/348913-Intricacies-of-the-30-Month-Stay-in-Pharmaceutical-Patent-Cases/. 
 174 See Kurt R. Karst, A Pre-MMA-180-Day Exclusivity Punt? What Gives?, FDA LAW BLOG (Jan. 8, 
2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2013/01/a-pre-mma-180-day-exclusivity-punt-what-gives/. 
 175 Final Rule, supra note 137.  
 176 Id. 
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takes place within nine months of patent grant177 and an Inter Partes Review 
(IPR) which takes place after termination of a PGR or at nine months after patent 
grant.178 A generic pharmaceutical manufacturer may hesitate to enter into such 
proceedings which creates estoppel issues in district court ANDA litigation for 
any issue that was “raised or could have reasonably been raised” at the PTAB.179 
Further, a March 2017 study indicates that branded pharmaceutical patents 
usually are upheld by IPRs.180 Roughly 5% of IPR petitions challenged Orange-
listed patents.181 For such petitions, the PTAB instituted IPRs for 44% 
(compared to 53% overall) and issued final written decisions in 38% of such 
petitions.182 Of such petitions, only 16% resulted in final written decisions 
finding all claims unpatentable (compared to 23% overall), while 50% resulted 
in final written decisions holding no claims unpatentable (compared to 7% 
overall).183  
An ANDA filer alternatively may petition the court for a declaratory 
judgment of invalidity or noninfringement of Orange Book-listed patents, but 
only after an NDA holder fails to bring a patent infringement lawsuit within 
forty-five days of receiving notice and establishes an Article III “case or 
controversy[,]”which requires more than a patent listing in the Orange Book.184  
3. Lessons from the South Korean Patent Certification/Notification System 
a. Overview of South Korean Patent Certification/Notification System 
Under South Korea’s PAA, a generic applicant is only exempt from 
notifying both the patent owner and the listing party of the filing of a marketing 
approval application where: (a) relevant patents are expired (equivalent to 
ANDA Paragraph II Certification); (b) marketing of the generic drug begins 
 
 177 Post Grant Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-
decisions/trials/post-grant-review (last visited May 20, 2018). 
 178 Inter Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-
decisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last visited May 20, 2018). 
 179 Major Differences between IPR, PGR, and CBM, USPTO.GOV, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ 
files/ip/boards/. . ./aia_trial_comparison_chart.pptx (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
 180 Steve Brachmann, Report shows drug patents fare better in IPR proceedings at PTAB, IPWATCHDOG 
(July 18, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/18/drug-patents-fare-better-ipr-proceedings-ptab/id= 
85628/. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See generally Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V. O’Shaughnessy, One Year after MedImmune—The 
Impact on Patent Licensing & Negotiation, FED. CIR. B.J. (Oct. 2008). 
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after relevant patents expire (equivalent to ANDA Paragraph III); or (c) a 
registered patent owner and patent listing party waive the applicant’s notice 
requirement (so-called “authorized generics”).185 However, if an applicant 
contests the validity and/or alleges infringement of enforceable patents prior to 
marketing the generic drug (equivalent to ANDA Paragraph IV Certification),186 
the MFDS requires the applicant to complete such notification prior to granting 
marketing approval or revised marketing approval.187    
b. South Korea Incentivizes Early Challenges to Green Listed Patents  
The KIPO handles select patent disputes through the Intellectual Property 
Trial and Appeal Board (IPTAB), the equivalent to the PTAB at the USPTO.188 
The United States’ and South Korean patent dispute resolution mechanisms are 
similar, yet each system operates slightly differently.189 A generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer may challenge a patent before the IPTAB prior to 
filing for MFDS marketing approval by filing: (a) a “negative scope 
confirmation” claim seeking a judgment that a generic drug does not infringe the 
patent;190 (b) a patent cancellation claim by anyone within six months of issued 
patent publication on a narrow basis; or (c) a patent invalidation claim any time 
after patent registration by an “interested party” on a broad basis.191  
Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are highly likely to file patent scope 
confirmation actions, patent cancellation actions, or patent invalidation actions 
in advance of seeking MFDS marketing approval of a generic pharmaceutical.192 
Once the IPTAB issues a judgment favorable to the generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, a Korean generic applicant is no longer subject to a branded stay 
of generic sales.193   
C. Comparison of Branded Pharmaceutical Marketing Exclusion Periods 
An action seeking confirmation that a generic drug does not infringe a 
branded patent is a unique proceeding before the IPTAB unavailable in the 
 
 185 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, supra note 87, art. 50-4(1). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. art. 50-4(6). 
 188 Patent Court of Korea, About the Court, SUP. CT. KOR.: PAT. CT. KOR. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://patent. 
scourt.go.kr/patent_e/intro/intro_01/index.html. 
 189 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 5. 
 190 Id. 
 191 New Patent Cancellation System for South-Korea, LC PATS. (July 25, 2017), https://www. 
lcpatents.eu/en/news/new_patent_cancellation_system_for_south-korea/21.  
 192 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 5. 
 193 Kim et al., supra note 35. 
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United States.194 Several Hatch–Waxman system problems could be solved if 
similar PTAB proceedings were available to generic pharmaceutical companies 
to obtain judgments of negative patent scope and noninfringement prior to filing 
ANDA applications as an alternative to litigation.  
1. Loopholes in the Hatch–Waxman Branded Stay of Generic Sales 
a. The Cost of Litigation Is a Disincentive for ANDA Filers 
Only the largest generic companies can afford ANDA litigation,195 which 
adds $10 million or more to an ANDA Paragraph IV challenge.196 Due to high 
litigation costs, generic applicants often abandon their challenges, leaving bad 
patents intact; or, they accept settlements in return for delaying the commercial 
sales of generic drugs.197 By 2010, “pay-for-delay” settlements198 had delayed 
generic market entry by roughly seventeen months and saved branded 
pharmaceutical companies at least $20 billion in lost revenues to generics.199  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been partially successful in using 
antitrust laws to deter pay-for-delay settlements.200 In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that a branded pharmaceutical manufacturer pay-for-delay 
settlement to a generic competitor can violate antitrust laws.201 However, FTC 
antitrust proceedings occur after settlements have taken place and involve 
further burdensome litigation.202 While legislators have suggested making pay-
for-delay contracts illegal,203 a better solution is to disincentive rather than to 
punish such agreements. 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66, at 317–18. 
 196 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 25, at 952. 
 197 Bhardwaj et al., supra note 66, at 318. 
 198 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1, (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-
pharmaceutical-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/ 
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. 
 199 Id. at 2. 
 200 See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 343, 343 (U.S. 2013) [hereinafter FTC]. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See generally Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Commitment 
Decisions in Antitrust Cases, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 (June 2, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/873491/download. 
 203 Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending the Federal Trade 
Commission Act to make pay-for-delay contracts illegal, including monetary payments and any form of benefit 
to generic manufacturers). 
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2. Lessons from the South Korean Branded Marketing Exclusion Period 
a. South Korean Administrative Proceedings Superior to Litigation  
Patent owners of listed drugs have forty-five days from receipt of notice of 
a generic application for marketing approval to both (a) file patent litigation 
against generic applicants and (b) apply with the MFDS for a stay of generic sale 
against the generic pharmaceutical.204 Patent owners applying for a stay of 
generic sale must first (a) seek an injunction or action to prevent patent 
infringement or (b) initiate an action for patent scope confirmation of the listed 
patent against the generic applicant providing notice.205 Branded pharmaceutical 
companies often file “positive [patent] scope confirmation” claims with the 
IPTAB seeking judgment that a generic pharmaceutical would infringe the listed 
patent.206 Disputes are most often filed at the IPTAB than at a district court to 
settle issues of “generation, amendment, expiry and scope of patent rights . . . 
.”207 IPTAB trials are usually shorter than district court trials.208 Several Hatch–
Waxman problems may be solved by requiring branded pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to petition for stays of generic sales and offering an accelerated 
and less expensive PTAB pathway for settling patent issues.  
b. South Korean Revocable Stay of Generic Sales Promotes Competition 
A generic applicant may avoid a branded marketing stay by obtaining 
favorable judgment of patent invalidity or scope prior to filing for marketing 
approval with the MFDS.209 Without a generic favorable judgment, a branded 
pharmaceutical manufacturer may petition the MFDS for a stay of generic sales 
against the generic applicant and the MFDS will not approve the generic 
marketing application for nine months.210 A stay of generic sales may be denied 
or cancelled if: (a) a patent owner did not apply within forty-five days from 
receipt of notice; (b) a Green List patent is ineligible for listing due to an expired, 
invalid, or fraudulent listings; (c) the generic drug would not infringe the listed 
 
 204 NIFPSE, supra note 151, at 36.  
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 206 Young Sun Cho et al., Overview and Implications of the Drug Patent-Approval Linkage System in 
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patent; or (d) a patent owner violates the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act.211  
To solve problems with the current Hatch–Waxman system, the following 
amendments are recommended: (a) reduce a stay of generic sales from thirty 
months to nine months; (b) make a stay of generic sales contingent on proper 
Orange Book listings; (c) narrow the criteria for Orange Book eligibility; (d) 
require the FDA to correct or delete improper Orange Book listings; and (e) 
expand pre-ANDA filing USPTO actions for patent invalidity and 
noninfringement. Limiting the ability of branded pharmaceutical companies to 
bind generic applicants in ANDA litigation is likely to stimulate greater generic 
drug competition. 
D. Comparison of First-to-File Generic Marketing Exclusion Periods  
1. Overview of Hatch–Waxman 180-day Stays of Later Filed Generics 
Under Hatch–Waxman, the FDA offers a 180-day exclusive right to “first-
to-file” generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to market the generic drug.212 The 
stay of later filed generic sales was designed to encourage ANDA filers to 
challenge patents asserted by branded pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
particularly patents of questionable validity and scope.213 The first-to-file 180-
day marketing exclusion period allows generic challengers to recover the cost of 
ANDA litigation from the greater profits available prior to the arrival of later 
generic competitors.214 
The exclusion period allows a first-to-file generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer to charge extremely high prices and garner significant profits.215 
Once other generic competitors enter the market, prices fall tremendously and a 
first-to-file generic pharmaceutical manufacturer often experiences a dramatic 
drop in sales.216 Nevertheless, the first-to-file generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer benefits from a first-mover advantage that allows early customers 
to remain in the market even after competitors enter it.217 
 
 211 Id.; Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, supra note 87, art. 50-5(4).  
 212 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 25, at 953. 
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 217 Id. 
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2. Loopholes in Hatch–Waxman 180-Day Stays of Later Filed Generic 
Sales 
a. Insufficient Profit Motive for ANDA Paragraph IV Challengers 
The first-to-file generic 180-day marketing exclusion period is only semi-
exclusive given that all ANDA Paragraph IV challengers that file for the same 
drug on the same day are considered “first applicant[s].”218 Branded 
pharmaceutical manufacturers will also license the right to sell generic versions 
of the listed drug just prior to patent expiration to reduce the potential profits 
provided to the first generic to file an ANDA Paragraph IV challenge.219 
b. Pay-for-Delay Block Later ANDA Paragraph IV Challengers 
The FDA is unable to approve subsequent ANDA applications until the 180-
day generic marketing exclusion period expires.220 The 180-day exclusion 
period is triggered by the earlier of a “[first] commercial marketing” of a generic 
drug or a ‘court decision’ [holding a] patent invalid, unenforceable or not 
infringed . . . .”221 Pay-for-delay settlements (a) remove the trigger of “a court 
decision” and (b) often stipulate that the first-to-file ANDA Paragraph IV 
applicant must delay “first commercial marketing” until closer to the patent 
expiration date.222 Thus, the FDA is effectively blocked from approving later 
filed ANDA Paragraph IV applications.223  
c. Rules for Forfeiture of Eligibility for 180-Day Stay are Ineffective  
The MMA created the basis for a first filing ANDA Paragraph IV applicant 
to forfeit eligibility for the 180-day marketing exclusion period.224 Forfeiture 
events include: “(a) failure to market; (b) withdrawal of application; (c) 
 
 218 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) et al., Guidance for Industry 180-Day Exclusivity: 
Questions and Answers 6 (2003) [hereinafter 180-Day Q&A], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM536725.pdf. 
 219 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 30, at 333–34. 
 220 CDER, Small Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Pharmaceutical Exclusivity, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069964.htm (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2018). 
 221 Renu Lal, Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRON. (May 19, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm447307.pdf (Section 5 on the “180-
Day Exclusivity”).  
 222 Health Policy Brief: Patent Settlements, HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, 1 (2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
do/10.1377/hpb20170721.583967/full/healthpolicybrief_170.pdf. 
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amendment of certification; (d) failure to obtain tentative approval; (e) entry into 
agreement with another applicant, the listed drug application holder, or a patent 
owner; and (f) expiration of all patents.”225 Upon the occurrence of certain 
events, first applicants become ineligible for the generic 180-day marketing 
exclusion period.226  If no first filing ANDA applicants are eligible for the 
generic 180-day marketing exclusion period, the FDA will commence with 
marketing approval of all subsequently filed ANDA applications.227 However, 
the FDA only rarely holds forfeiture to have occurred.228 
First, although pay-for-delay settlements would appear to fall within an 
“agreement,” such a forfeiture event requires the FTC to determine that a 
specific pay-for-delay settlement had violated antitrust laws.229 To date, the 
FDA has never revoked a first filer’s 180-day marketing exclusion period on this 
basis.230 In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court held pay-for-delay 
settlements may violate the antitrust laws but did not declare them illegal per 
se.231 Further, the 180-day generic exclusion period will most likely have been 
triggered and run its course by the time the FTC has ruled a particular pay-for-
delay settlement to have violated antitrust laws.232  
Second, a 180-day generic exclusion period for “failure to market” is 
extremely difficult to invoke. The MMA forfeiture provisions are a “poorly 
drafted nuanced web of ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’ language that, when 
formally applied, leaves a pioneer and first filer almost completely in control 
and able to thwart Congress’s goals.”233 The MMA forfeiture provisions allow 
for forfeiture if:  
[t]he first applicant fails to market the drug by the later of— 
(aa) [a date determined by the first filer’s submission and final 
approval dates]; or 
 
 225 Id. at 4–5.  
 226 Id. at 5.  
 227 Id. 
 228 See generally id. 
 229 Randi Hernandez, FDA Clarifies How It Handles 180-Day Exclusivity, BIOPHARMINTERNATIONAL 
(Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.biopharminternational.com/fda-clarifies-how-it-handles-180-day-exclusivity. 
 230 Id. 
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(bb) with respect to the first applicant or any other applicant . . . 
the date that is 75 days after . . . at least 1 of the following has 
occurred: 
(AA) In an infringement action . . . or in a declaratory judgment 
action . . . a court enters a final decision from which no appeal . . 
. has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed. 
(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment action 
. . . a court signs a settlement order . . . that includes a finding that 
the patent is invalid or not infringed.234 
The MMA states that forfeiture for “failure to market” is triggered when a 
first-filer fails to market a generic drug by either a date calculated from the first-
filer’s submission and approval dates, found in subpart (aa) or a date based on a 
court’s final judgment of the patent on the merits, found in subpart (bb), 
whichever occurs later.235  According to the FDA’s interpretation of the statute, 
“failure to market” is only triggered when events set forth in both subparts (aa) 
and (bb) occur.236  While determining the critical date in subpart (aa) is 
straightforward, the critical date in subpart (bb) may be triggered by litigation 
against a first applicant or any other applicant over a period of “seemingly 
indefinite length.”237 
A branded pharmaceutical manufacturer may readily manipulate such a 
provision by either settling the lawsuit which avoids a court judgment of patent 
validity or non-infringement of subpart (bb)(AA).238 Further, such a settlement 
can specifically omit any determination of patent validity or non-infringement 
which avoids the triggering event within subpart (bb)(BB) – except in the 
unlikely event that a later filed ANDA applicant were to seek such a judgment 
of patent validity or non-infringement.239 Consequently, the MMA forfeiture 
provision “lacks any real teeth.”240 
 
 234 Id. (Brian Apel’s interpretion of the original statutory language). For the original statutory language, 
see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2017). 
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3. Lessons from South Korean Stay of Later Filed Generic Sales 
a. South Korean First-to-File Exclusivity Encourages More Applicants 
While the United States offers generic drug first-to-file exclusivity to ANDA 
applicants but not to 501(b)(2) applicants, Korea extends eligibility for first-to-
file exclusivity to all applicants relying on the original applicant’s clinical 
data.241 The generic drug first-to-file exclusivity acts to bar the sale of later filed 
generic drugs for nine months calculated from the date a first filer may sell the 
generic drug.242  
A generic applicant seeking exclusive priority of sale must file a petition for 
one of the following proceedings at the KIPO prior to applying for marketing 
approval: patent invalidity trial (Article 133 of the Korean Patent Act); patent 
extension invalidity trial (Article 134 of the Korean Patent Act); or patent scope 
confirmation trial (Article 135 of the Korean Patent Act).243 Priority of sale is 
granted to those (a) first to file a marketing approval application; (b) first to file 
a patent challenge that returns a favorable judgment of patent invalidity, 
invalidity of term extension, or noninfringement (for at least one listed patent 
within twelve months); and (c) first to obtain such a favorable judgment in a 
patent challenge within twelve months.244 All applicants who file a marketing 
approval application on the same day are considered first-to-file.245 Similarly, 
all applicants filing a patent challenge within fourteen days of the first action are 
considered first-to-file.246 
Several Hatch–Waxman problems may be solved by increasing the number 
of ANDA Paragraph IV challengers eligible to share marketing exclusivity since 
greater competition will reduce the market price of the generic pharmaceutical 
more quickly. However, to incentivize ANDA Paragraph IV challengers to seek 
marketing exclusivity when each challenger’s share of potential profits will 
decrease, Hatch–Waxman will likely need to follow South Korea’s example and 
increase the length of the generic marketing exclusion period (e.g., nine months). 
Further, Hatch–Waxman will need to create early PTAB proceedings for use by 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking to qualify for the generic 
marketing exclusion period.   
 
 241 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 9. 
 242 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, supra note 87, art. 50-9(2). 
 243 Id. art. 50-7(2). 
 244 Kim et al., supra note 35, at 10. 
 245 Id. at 9. 
 246 Id. at 10. 
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b. South Korean Forfeiture Rules Discourage Pay-for-Delay Deals 
Branded pharmaceutical companies have less incentive to offer pay-for-
delay settlements in Korea compared to the United States.247 The MFDS will 
revoke a generic drug marketing exclusion period if a generic drug applicant 
fails to begin marketing a generic drug within 2 months of MFDS regulatory 
approval without justification (Article 50-10(2)(2) of the PAA).248 The United 
States could prevent branded pharmaceutical manufacturers from manipulating 
the indefinite critical dates of the MMA forfeiture provisions by defining 
forfeiture solely upon the date of FDA marketing approval without reference to 
any litigation event.249 
4. Recent KIPO Statistics Reveal Emerging Generic Drug Filing Strategies  
a. Substantial Increase in Overall KIPO Filings 
The revised South Korean law first permitted patent listings in 2012.250 
While only forty-nine patent listing-related challenges were filed at the KIPO in 
2013, this number increased to 216 in 2015; by September 2015, the number 
increased even more significantly to 1853.251 Generic drugs were first eligible 
for generic drug sales exclusivity as of March 2015, which presumably led to 
the significant rise in KIPO filings in 2015.252 Further, there is great incentive 
for generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to file KIPO actions within fourteen 
days of the actual first filed action to preserve their ability to sell a generic drug 
during the marketing exclusion period if the challenged patent is eventually 
invalidated.253  
b. KIPO Filings Indicate Motive to Preserve First Filer Status 
Generic manufacturers have primarily filed patent invalidation actions 
(61%), followed by PTE invalidation actions (30%), and negative scope 
confirmation actions (9%).254 A PTE invalidation action will only shorten or 
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eliminate additional patent term granted in compensation for MFDS delays in 
regulatory approval, while the original patent term remains unaffected.255 One 
reason for such a large number of PTE filings is that a generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer without concrete plans to market a generic drug may file such an 
action to preserve the right to do so if the invalidation action succeeds.256  On 
the other hand, a negative scope confirmation action requires comparison of the 
branded pharmaceutical with a generic version that exists or will exist.257  The 
vast majority (eighty percent) of PTE invalidity actions were for compound 
claims, suggesting that PTEs were selected over regular patent invalidity actions 
for compound claims which are generally strong.258   
c. Generic KIPO Filings Depend on Post-Marketing Surveillance  
Mandatory post-marketing safety (PMS) studies in South Korea create “de 
facto data exclusivity period[s]” since generic pharmaceuticals may not be 
approved until such post-marketing tests have ended.259 As of 2015, over eighty 
percent of KIPO filings were challenges to branded drugs whose PMS period 
would not expire prior to 2017.260 One reason why KIPO actions are filed so 
early in the post-marketing surveillance period may be the desire to preserve 
generic exclusivity rights even without any concrete plans to market a generic.261 
The fact that such actions are mostly of patent invalidation and patent term 
extension invalidation—as opposed to negative scope confirmation actions—
supports this conclusion.262 Another reason why a generic manufacturer seeking 
to preserve generic exclusivity rights would file early might be to ensure that 
any decision in the generic manufacturer’s favor falls within nine-month period 
after the generic application filing date.263  
 
 255 Id.; Patent Act, Act. No. 950 of 1961, amended by Act No. 14112, Mar. 29, 2016, art. 134 (S. Kor.), 
translated in Korean Intellectual Property Office online database, http://www.kipo.go.kr/upload/en/download/ 
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d. Trends in KIPO Actions Moving Forward 
While initial KIPO action filings have steadily increased, such actions might 
decrease substantially moving forward.264 As of 2016, roughly thirty to forty 
percent of such filed actions were later terminated or withdrawn.265 Such 
statistics indicate that initial KIPO filings are made to preserve generic 
exclusivity rights and that generic manufacturers later reconsider a launch of the 
specific generic pharmaceutical.266 Further, the MFDS only grants generic 
exclusivity rights if a generic manufacturer files an application for marketing 
approval while the challenged patent is still in force.267 Generic companies may 
withdraw KIPO filings to resubmit later so that favorable patent invalidity 
determinations do not precede generic approval application.268   
South Korea’s patent linkage system is still very new and the MFDS is still 
adjusting the process to encourage generic challenges to branded pharmaceutical 
patents while not overloading the KIPO with indiscriminate filings.269 However, 
early statistics show that the system provides incentives for generic 
manufacturer to file KIPO actions and to do so prior to filing applications for 
generic marketing approval to ensure generic marketing exclusivity.270 
e. Anticipated Results for Hatch–Waxman 
Based on South Korea’s recent statistics, if Hatch–Waxman allowed early 
USPTO patent proceedings, a great number of generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers would likely participate.271 Many generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers would file such challenges to preserve their right to seek first-to-
file generic exclusivity. Many generic pharmaceutical companies are likely to 
file such proceedings even before fully committing to launching a product in the 
market. For example, such proceedings would be desirable to later ANDA filers 
to avoid litigation and stays of generic approval. Therefore, as modeled by South 
Korea, further refinement may be needed to prevent an overload of merely 
speculative USPTO patent challenges.     
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CONCLUSION  
This Comment has analyzed loopholes within the U.S. Hatch–Waxman 
system commonly exploited by branded pharmaceutical companies and has 
proposed adopting certain counterpart provisions of the South Korean 
pharmaceutical regulatory system as a solution. This Comment predicts that 
enacting such Hatch–Waxman reforms will increase competition in the market 
and consequentially lower drug prices in the United States.  
There are, of course, several factors which may affect the ultimate outcome 
of such a proposal which are unpredictable. First, the South Korean patent 
linkage system is still relatively nascent, and there is scarce information from 
which to conclude whether it will achieve the desired growth of its generic 
pharmaceutical industry. Also, since South Korea caps branded and generic 
pharmaceutical prices, it is impossible to use such data to predict whether 
adopting South Korea’s patent linkage system will reduce U.S. pharmaceutical 
prices.272 However, the case of Zocor® gives hope that pharmaceutical prices 
will fall with greater generic competition.273 
Another factor to note, this Comment has focused primarily on shifting 
power away from the branded pharmaceutical industry toward the generic sector 
in the expectation that this will lower prices to the consumer. However, generic 
pharmaceutical companies also participate in price gouging strategies.274 Most 
notably, in 2016, the price of a two-pack EpiPen rose to $600 from $90 ten years 
before.275 In 2015, Marathon Pharmaceuticals sold two heart drugs, Isuprel and 
Nitropress, to Valeant Pharmaceuticals, who raised their respective prices by 
718% and 300%.276 While competition should reduce all pharmaceutical prices, 
both branded and generic, this Comment anticipates that additional tailored 
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efforts may be necessary to address problems in the generic pharmaceutical 
industry.  
Potentially serious unintended consequences of such a power shift are a real 
concern. For example, greater competition from generic drugs may lead to 
branded pharmaceutical companies choosing to invest less on innovative 
research. Generic pharmaceutical companies, on the other side, may hesitate to 
file early ANDA Paragraph IV challenges if the potential profit during the 
generic market exclusivity period is too diluted by large groups of first filers. If 
these scenarios arise, future corrections may be needed. 
In the thirty years since the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman, the intended 
balance of branded and generic pharmaceutical companies has shifted—
therefore the Hatch–Waxman system will require continual readjustment. This 
Comment does not propose that the United States adopt South Korea’s 
pharmaceutical regulatory system verbatim. Instead, this Comment points to 
several ways that the United States would accelerate generic pharmaceutical 
competition by looking to toward the South Korean system as a guide for the 
future Hatch–Waxman amendments. 
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